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兰州大学110周年校庆年系列活动——管理理论前沿系列讲座第28期

文章来源:行政办公室 作者:洪兆富 审核:吴建祖 发布时间:2019年07月05日 点击数: 字号:【

应运营与财务管理研究所洪兆富副教授邀请,美国圣克拉拉大学蔡港树教授来我院举办学术讲座。欢迎感兴趣的师生积极参加!

主题:Who Benefits From Banning Discriminatory Wholesale Pricing When Retailers Can Price Match?

主讲人:蔡港树 教授

主持人:洪兆富 副教授

时 间:2019年7月11日(周四)上午9:00-10:30

地 点:齐云楼204会议室

讲座简介:

(1) Problem definition: The extant literature has independently discussed wholesale price discrimination and price-matching guarantees (PMGs); however, it has been mute on the interaction between retailers' PMGs and manufacturers' discriminatory wholesale pricing.

(2) Academic/Practical relevance: In practice, numerous retailers are implementing PMGs. On the other hand, wholesale price discrimination has been widely practiced by manufacturers in some markets, while it is banned in others.

(3) Methodology: We utilize game theory to explore the interaction between the retailers' equilibrium PMG and pricing decisions and the manufacturer's optimal wholesale pricing strategies in a supply chain model with one manufacturer and two retailers.

(4) Results: If wholesale price discrimination is banned, then retailers tacitly collude by offering PMG. However, the collusive role of PMGs subsides if the manufacturer may implement discriminatory wholesale pricing. Therefore, a ban on wholesale price discrimination in an industry where retailers can offer PMGs reduces supply chain efficiency, consumer welfare, and social welfare. The negative impact of PMGs arising from banning wholesale price discrimination grows stronger with the degree of retailer asymmetry, and is more likely to happen when retailers differ in operational efficiency rather than market efficiency. Under a regulation against discriminatory wholesale pricing with retailer asymmetry, there exists a Pareto zone such that all firms prefer that only one of the two retailers offers PMG. Moreover, the presence of more uninformed customers reduces the negative impact of banning wholesale price discrimination, and it is more likely for PMGs to prevail if the retailers can delay their PMGs decisions to be after wholesale price decisions.

(5) Managerial implications: Our findings suggest against a ban on wholesale price discrimination in industries where retailers can offer PMGs in terms of supply chain profits, consumer and social welfare, although such a ban can be beneficial when PMGs are not practiced。

主讲人简介

蔡港树博士,美国圣克拉拉大学教授,中国管理科学与工程学会供应链与运营管理分会主任,主要研究方向是电子商务、多渠道供应链管理、供应链金融等领域。他曾荣获过许多院级、校级以及国际最佳教学奖,研究奖和服务奖,包括国际权威期刊Decision Sciences杰出副主编奖和国际生产与运营管理协会(POMS)最佳教学创新奖。蔡教授现为国际顶级期刊Production and Operations Management资深编辑、Decision Sciences副主编。

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